# Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan

### Jeroen van de Graaf

<sup>1</sup>Laboratório de Computação Científica – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) Av. Antônio Carlos 6627 – 31270-901 – Belo Horizonte (MG) – Brasil

jvdg@lcc.ufmg.br

**Abstract.** We describe a variation of Prêt-à-Voter that keeps the same ballot layout but borrows and slightly modifies the underlying cryptographic primitives from Punchscan, substituting the mix network for bit commitments.

#### 1. Introduction

Over the last few years we have seen a sequence of papers on voter-verifiable elections. The idea of such systems is that the voter takes home a receipt which allows him to verify that her vote is included in the tally without revealing any usefull information about her vote. Though this idea is not new, Chaum's paper [2] arguably gave a new impetus to this line of research (see also [1]).

Chaum's paper was improved upon in two significant ways. First there is a protocol called Prêt-à-Voter (PaV), as described in [3], which has several advantages over [2], such as a simpler ballot lay-out, pre-printed ballots on which the voter marks his preferences with a pen thus insuring that the voting machine (DRE) does not learn the vote, etc. However, PaV still uses decryption mixing. Inspired by this, Chaum developed PunchScan (PS). See the site www.punchscan.org for fancy demos. For a detailed protocol description we refer to [6] and [4]. PS differs from PaV in several aspects: (1) in each ballot both the top and bottom layer are permuted; (2) a mark is placed on both layers; (3) the voter gets to choose which layer he keeps and which gets destroyed; (4) no mixing takes place; the only cryptographic primitive needed is a Bit Commitment scheme.

In this paper we obtain a new protocol by merging PaV and PS as follows: we maintain PaV's ballot lay-out but we borrow the underlying cryptographic primitives from PS. Apart from giving us a thorough understanding of the similarities and differences between the two protocols, the final result seems superior to both because compared to PaV it disposes of mixing, while compared to PS it results in a simpler ballot lay-out.

The outline of this paper is as follows: we start with a high-level description of the PaV ballot, but instead of using mixing we describe how to apply the underlying cryptographic ideas used in PS to PaV. We also propose some improvements to the protocol, and provide a very brief description of the cryptography of Punchscan. We assume that the reader is familiar with the general setting and the terminology of voting protocols.

# 2. The Prêt-à-Voter Ballot

The ballots used in PaV are described in detail in [3], section 4, using an example with 4 candidates. A base canonical ordering of candidates is defined: 0: Anarchist, 1: Alchemist, 2: Nihilist, 3: Buddhist. An example ballot looks like this (section 4.1):

3: Buddhist	X
0: Anarchist	
1: Alchemist	
2: Nihilist	
(Offset $x = 1$ )	Qqkr3c

The left part contains a cyclic permutation (shift) of the candidates; in this case the offset x=1 (we use cyclic permutations to simplify the exposition, but the protocols generalize to full permutations). The right part is empty except for the last row, and the voter votes by putting an "X" in one of its first four cells. The magic string Qqkr3c (in reality probably longer) is an encryption of x, encrypted with the public keys of the mixes.

Casting the vote consists of separating the left and the right columns, destroying the left column and scanning the right column. Either manually or through OCR the row containing the X and the encryption of the offset are associated to the ballot image. The voter can take the right column home as a receipt. At the end of the day, all ballots will enter the mix process. That is, each mix contributes in decrypting the shift and shuffling all the ballots; see section 6 of [3].

### 3. Using bit commitments instead of mixing

Mixing is a tedious process and has several disadvantages: it is difficult to explain to the average person, the privacy of the ballot is only computational, it is computationally intensive, etc. A protocol that uses bit commitment does not have these disadvantages: pieces of papers in an enveloppe serve as an excellent explanation for BCs, unconditionally hiding bit commitment schemes exist, and they are certainly not less efficient than mixing. Therefore our purpose here is to develop a variant of PaV using BCs.

Since Punchscan uses two permutatons, both the top and the bottom layer, a straightforward idea is to break the offset value x in two, i.e. to choose  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  random such that  $x = x_1 + x_2 \pmod{m}$ . We let the Election Authority(EA) commit to  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ . We write these BCs at the bottom of the right column on the ballot (like in PaV) or, alternatively, we have the EA commit to these values publicly and use a unique ballot id number to establish the link between the two BCs published and the printed ballot.

Furthermore we use the following notation: x is the offset; y is the number of the row marked by the voter, counting from 0 to m-1; v is the actual vote, that is, the row chosen in the canonical representation. Obviously,  $y=x+v \pmod m$ , where the modulus m is the number of candidates on the ballot; in the example m=4.

Let us now describe the table to be created by the Election Authority (EA) before the election which is a simplification of Punchscan's. Note the hats on the symbols for some columns; these mean that each cell in that column is a bit commitment. The columns labelled y,  $y-x_1$  and v will remain empty until the counting of the votes, as we will see below.

i	y	$\hat{j}$	$\widehat{x_1}$	$y-x_1$	$\widehat{x_2}$	$\widehat{\pi_2(j)}$	v
1							
• • •							
2R							

Observe that the table is divided in a left, middle and right part. Let  $\pi_1$  be the permutation between the rows of the left and the middle part, and  $\pi_2$  between the rows of the middle and the right part. Then the columns labelled  $\hat{j} = \widehat{\pi_1(i)}$  and  $\widehat{\pi_2(j)}$  are used to define and to verify these two permutations.

Auditing the ballot construction Let there be 2R rows. The set of rows is divided randomly in an audit set A and election set E both of size R. The EA is now required to open all bit commitments related to A: it must open all rows i in the left part of the table if  $i \in A$  and all rows with index j in the middle part of the table if  $j = \pi_1(i)$  and  $i \in A$ . The right part contains no commitments. Scrutineers should check that all bit commitments were created honestly. After the audit, the EA prints the unopened ballots with index  $i \in E$ .

**The election** The voter casts her vote as described earlier, and for each vote the value  $y_i$  is determined. Since EA also knows  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  he can compute the corresponding values  $y_j - x_{j1}$  and  $v_k$ .

**Publishing the results** After the election, the EA publishes  $y_i$  for each  $i \in E$ ,  $y_j - x_{j1}$  for each  $j \in \pi_1(E)$  and  $v_k$  for each  $k \in \pi_2(\pi_1(E))$ . From the column labelled v he calculates the tally, which can be verified by anybody.

Auditing the votes published The EA could try to cheat by modifying the values  $v_k$ . We therefore first define the following *naive* approach: for each j in the middle part of the table a random bit is created out of EA's control: Left or Right, which has the following sematics:

**Left** The EA opens  $\widehat{x_{j1}}$  and it is verified whether  $y_{\pi_1^{-1}(j)} - x_{j1} = (y - x_1)_j$  holds.

**Right** The EA opens  $\widehat{x_{j2}}$  and it is verified whether  $(y-x_1)_j=x_{j2}+v_{\pi_2(j)}$  holds. Observe that this equation should be satisfied because  $y=x+v=x_1+x_2+v$  so  $y-x_1=x_2+v$ .

Using this approach we catch a cheating EA with probability 1/2 for each vote  $v_k$  he modifies. However, too much information is revealed about the overall permutation  $\pi = \pi_2 \circ \pi_1$  between the left and the right part of the table, violating voter privacy. We can think of three possible ways out:

- (1) We do K versions of this protocol in parallel, each with different bit commitments and one Left/Right choices for all rows in each parallel version. Then the probability of EA getting away is  $2^{-K}$ . This is the solution adopted by Punchscan ([4], section 5.4).
- (2) Instead of using two permutations  $\pi_1$  and  $\pi_2$ , we use four. We also split x in four parts:  $x = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 \pmod{m}$ . Then we use Chaum's improvement [2] of the mixing protocol proposed in [5]. See [1] for a detailed description.
- (3) We use a special kind of bit commitment scheme that has a homomorphic property: we assume that the multiplication of two bit commitments is equivalent to the addition  $\pmod{m}$  of their contents. BCs with this property can be constructed from from homomorphic encryption schemes. This variant does not trivially generalize to elections in which a mere cyclic shift will not do and full permutations are needed.

# 4. A brief description of Punchscan

The header of the table used by Punchscan is as follows:

i	$\widehat{x_1}$ $P_{.1}$	$\widehat{x_2}$ $P_{.2}$	$\widehat{j}$ $D_{.1}$	$\widehat{t_1}$ $D_{.2}$	$y - t_1 \\ D_{.3}$	$\widehat{t_2}$ $D_{.4}$	$\widehat{\pi_2(j)} \ D_{.5}$	$v \\ R_{.1}$
• •	•							

The first row shows the notation introduced in this paper, whereas the second row shows the notation of [4] and [6]. Observe that where they use x, y, z as the indices of the left (P), middle (D) and right (R) part of the table, we use i, j, k, so that when they we write  $(x, P_3)$  we would write  $y_i$ , etc. Also, the description of Punchscan uses m = 2, so that adding  $1 \pmod{2}$  is called "flipping" or "inverting" the bit.

Simplifying this table by defining  $x_1 = t_1$ ;  $x_2 = t_2$  is tempting but leads to an *insecure* protocol because of the following difference between PaV and PS. In PaV the offset (or offsets, in the new protocol) is (are) kept secret: the left side of the ballot is destroyed, and the value on the right side is protected by a bit commitment. But in Punchscan the offset from the top  $(x_1)$  or bottom  $(x_2)$  layer can be deduced from the printed ballot. One layer gets destroyed but the other has its scanned image published, so this information, combined with the information about the destroyed layer revealed during the post-election audit, compromises the ballot security, which happens with p = 1/2. Therefore  $x_1, x_2, t_1$  and  $t_2$  are chosen randomly satisfying  $x_1 + x_2 = t_1 + t_2 \pmod{m}$ .

### 5. Conclusion

This paper started as a study the similarities and differences between Prêt-à-Voter and Punchscan. Surprisingly we found a merge which seems an improvement on both. Section 4 shows that cryptographically PS is actually slightly more complicated than the PaV variant presented in Section 3: the fact that *both* the top and the bottom layer can be flipped seems to complicate matters while the choice between top and bottom layers does not seem to add to the security of Punchscan, unlike in [2]. Also in terms of ballot lay-out there seems little difference between the two schemes.

#### References

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