Speculative Token Trading Platforms: Capital Dissipation, Bonding Curves, and Market Signals

Mauricio L. Miranda[1], Daniel S. Menasche[1], Milton R. Ramirez[1]

[1] Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro – RJ – Brasil

mmiranda@cos.ufrj.br, sadoc@ic.ufrj.br, milton@labma.ufrj.br

Abstract. *Speculative token markets exhibit a striking mismatch between high trading activity and low effective capital accumulation. In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon and show that it arises from capital dissipation driven by trading churn. We introduce a simple analytical framework based on an efficiency parameter that captures the fraction of trading volume converted into net inflow, and show that the volume required to reach a given capital threshold scales inversely with this efficiency.*
We further show that bonding-curve mechanisms amplify these effects by inducing convex price dynamics and concave supply growth, leading to sharp price movements even under limited accumulation. Empirically, we connect these mechanisms to observable patterns such as artificial liquidity, wallet clustering, and discrepancies between reported and effective market metrics. Building on these insights, we propose the Golden Triangle of Token Validation*, combining volume, fees, and ownership distribution to distinguish organic activity from coordinated behavior. Our results highlight the limitations of standard market indicators and the need for more robust measures of market quality in speculative token ecosystems.*

1. Introduction

In recent years, the cryptocurrency ecosystem has witnessed the rapid proliferation of highly speculative tokens, commonly referred to as shitcoins [Howson 2023]. These assets are typically characterized by low intrinsic value, extreme volatility, and strong dependence on hype-driven dynamics. Their lifecycle is often short, with value creation and destruction occurring over very brief time scales, driven by social signals, speculative demand, and asymmetric information among participants. As a result, these markets exhibit behaviors that deviate significantly from traditional financial systems, including rapid boom-and-bust cycles and a high prevalence of opportunistic strategies [Daian et al. 2020].

A central empirical puzzle in these markets is the coexistence of extremely high trading activity with very low rates of sustained success [Easley et al. 2012]. While large volumes of capital are continuously processed, only a small fraction of tokens reach maturity (e.g., migration to broader markets), suggesting that most trading activity does not translate into effective capital accumulation [Makarov and Schoar 2020, Victor and Weintraud 2021]. This phenomenon points to a fundamental inefficiency in speculative token ecosystems, where capital is largely dissipated through churn, reversals, and repeated transactions.

While prior work has extensively explored the economic, behavioral, and political aspects of speculative tokens, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the *platforms* that facilitate their trading. This omission is significant, as such platforms play a central role in shaping market behavior: they mediate access to liquidity, determine how information is presented to users, and influence decision-making through their interfaces and embedded analytics. In contrast to traditional exchanges, these emerging platforms tightly integrate execution, on-chain data, and social signals, effectively coupling observation and action in a single environment.

These platforms induce a distinctive microstructure characterized by high turnover and low effective accumulation, which we formalize through an efficiency parameter capturing the fraction of trading volume converted into net inflow [Victor and Weintraud 2021]. Under this perspective, the volume required for a token to reach a given capital threshold scales inversely with this efficiency. Consequently, tokens operating in highly dissipative environments must process substantially larger trading volumes to achieve the same outcome. This provides a simple explanation for the empirical observation that tokens with similar net inflows may exhibit vastly different levels of trading activity.

In parallel, the bonding-curve mechanisms used in these platforms introduce nonlinear price and supply dynamics. Prices grow convexly with retained capital, while supply grows concavely, implying that late-stage inflows have a disproportionately large effect on price. As a result, tokens approaching maturity may exhibit sharp price increases despite modest underlying accumulation, creating the appearance of strong momentum even in highly dissipative environments.

Motivated by these observations, this paper adopts an infrastructure-centric perspective and analyzes three platforms designed for speculative token trading: `axiom.trade`, `trade.padre.gg`, and `photon-sol.tinyastro.io`. Based on direct interaction with these systems and empirical inspection of transaction patterns, we identify recurring structural features that affect the interpretation of standard market indicators. In particular, we show that commonly used metrics such as volume and market capitalization may be misleading in the presence of churn, and that additional signals—such as transaction fees and wallet distribution—are necessary to assess market quality.

To the best of our knowledge, this is among the first studies to examine speculative-token trading platforms from an infrastructure-centric perspective. The main contributions of this work are as follows. First, we introduce a simple analytical framework that explains how capital dissipation and bonding-curve dynamics jointly shape market behavior. Second, we provide empirical evidence linking these mechanisms to observable patterns, including wallet clustering [Meiklejohn et al. 2013], artificial liquidity, and discrepancies between reported and effective market metrics [Daian et al. 2020]. Finally, we propose a unified diagnostic perspective, referred to as the *Golden Triangle of Token Validation*, which combines volume, fees, and supply distribution to distinguish organic activity from coordinated behavior.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces key concepts and terminology. Section 3 reports empirical observations. Section 4 introduces the analytical model and its implications. Section 5 reviews related work and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of practical implications.

2. Speculative Token Platforms: Background and, Mechanisms

Speculative token ecosystems are built upon a set of core concepts and infrastructural mechanisms that jointly shape their dynamics. A *launchpad* enables the rapid creation and initial distribution of tokens, often with minimal verification and near-zero cost. A *wallet* is the primary unit of interaction, representing a cryptographic entity that holds and transfers tokens. In this environment, a *rug pull* refers to a strategy in which liquidity is withdrawn after attracting traders, leading to abrupt value collapse. Finally, a *wallet cluster* denotes a group of addresses likely controlled by a single entity or coordinated actors, typically inferred through transaction patterns and interaction structure.

These elements interact within platforms specifically designed to support speculative trading. Such platforms have emerged to address key limitations in traditional token launches, particularly barriers to entry, trust, and execution speed. Token creation is effectively democratized, allowing users to deploy new assets as easily as publishing content. At the same time, bonding curve mechanisms ensure that liquidity remains locked during early stages, mitigating certain classes of rug pulls while introducing deterministic pricing based on cumulative investment. These platforms are further optimized for high-frequency trading, enabling users to react rapidly to short-lived trends and social signals.

2.1. Migration

A central concept in these ecosystems is *migration* (or "graduation"), which marks the transition from a platform-specific environment to a broader decentralized exchange, such as an Automated Market Maker (see Table 1). Migration occurs when a token reaches a threshold of net capital inflow, approximately 85 SOL in our setting. This transition serves as a form of market validation: it allows tokens to access external liquidity, become visible to a wider audience, and participate in global price discovery. However, as we show later, reaching this threshold often requires processing substantially larger trading volumes due to the dissipative nature of trading activity.

The persistence of speculative tokens can be explained by a combination of economic and behavioral factors. Low barriers to entry enable rapid token creation, while speculative demand attracts traders seeking high-risk, high-reward opportunities. Social amplification through online communities accelerates adoption, and asymmetric information provides advantages to early participants. These forces generate short-lived cycles in which tokens are created, traded intensely, and abandoned, sustaining a high-turnover environment.

The platforms themselves play a central role in shaping these dynamics. In what follows, we analyze three representative systems.

Axiom (`axiom.trade`) provides a unified interface combining execution, social monitoring, and wallet tracking, emphasizing information symmetry through real-time visibility into influential traders and social signals alongside low-latency execution. **Terminal** (`trade.padre.gg`) extends this paradigm to a multi-chain setting, offering advanced order types, execution optimization, and portfolio analytics, targeting both retail and professional users. **Photon** (`photon-sol.tinyastro.io`) prioritizes ultra-low latency and reliability, enabling rapid reaction to token launches and liquidity events through direct interaction with blockchain liquidity, making it particularly suited for short-term speculative strategies.

Across these platforms, the tight integration of execution, analytics, and social signals creates a feedback loop in which information and action are closely coupled. This

Table 1. Typical flow involves cheap creation (Speculative Platform) → hype → internal flow → (possibly) migration → real market (Raydium). The speculative platform is modeled using a bonding curve consistent with Fig. 1: price grows convexly with invested capital; supply increases concavely.

Aspect	**Speculative Platform**	**Raydium** [Angeris et al. 2019]
Price	Deterministic: $p(z) = \alpha z^{\gamma},\ \gamma > 1$	Market-driven: $r_1 \cdot r_2 = k$
Supply vs Capital	$y(z) = \beta \log(1 + z)$ (concave growth)	$r_2 = k/r_1$
Curve shape	Increasing, convex in price; concave in supply (price grows superlinearly with investment)	Hyperbolic (constant product invariant)
Liquidity	Artificial (curve-defined)	Real (LP-provided)
Objective	Launch / hype	Trading
Participants	Coordinated / social	Broad market
Efficiency	Low	High

structure amplifies coordination effects, accelerates trading cycles, and contributes to the high turnover observed in speculative token markets.

2.2. Analytics

An important complementary component of this ecosystem is the analytics layer, exemplified by tools such as **Bubblemaps**. Unlike traditional blockchain explorers, Bubblemaps provides a visual representation of wallet interactions, where nodes represent wallets and edges represent transfers. This allows for the identification of wallet clusters, revealing hidden concentration of token supply and coordinated behavior. Features such as clustering, historical tracing, and cross-chain analysis enable users to detect patterns that are not visible through standard metrics, making such tools essential for assessing market structure and risk.

Taken together, these platforms and tools define an ecosystem characterized by low entry barriers, high execution speed, and strong information asymmetries. While they enable rapid participation and innovation, they also facilitate coordinated activity, artificial liquidity, and misleading market signals. Understanding this infrastructural layer is therefore essential for interpreting observed market behavior and for distinguishing between organic and manipulated activity.

3. Methodology and Key Insights

Table 4 reports the migration-time distribution. Our analysis is based on a dataset of approximately 49,000 migrated tokens observed during 2025, complemented by direct interaction with trading platforms, inspection of user interfaces, and qualitative analysis of transaction patterns. We examine the relationships between trading volume, transaction fees, and supply distribution to infer underlying market dynamics and identify signals of organic versus coordinated activity.

Figure 1 summarizes aggregated metrics collected over a one-month period (March 2026), providing a system-level snapshot of the speculative token ecosystem. In contrast, the migration-time analysis presented later is based on a longitudinal dataset spanning January to October 2025. We use the former to characterize instantaneous market dynamics and the latter to capture temporal properties of token lifecycles. Figure 1 combines overall market statistics (Figure 1(a)), the pumpfun bonding curve model (Figure 1(b)), empirical buy-versus-sell dynamics (Figure 1(c)), and the capital intensity required for token migration (Figure 1(d)).

3.1. Migration

Throughout this analysis, values are expressed in SOL, the native cryptocurrency of the Solana blockchain, which serves as the unit of account for trading, fees, and liquidity provision in these platforms.

Figure 1 highlights a key insight: although relatively small amounts of net capital (measured in SOL) are sufficient to trigger migration (e.g., reaching the bonding curve threshold), the system as a whole processes much larger volumes due to high turnover and repeated trading during the pre-migration phase. This discrepancy between total activity and effective capital accumulation reflects the presence of trading friction and, in some cases, coordinated or artificial behavior.

Fig. 1(a) reports aggregate counts, including the total number of generated coins and the subset that became fully bonded, thereby quantifying the low conversion rate from creation to successful migration. Fig. 1(b) shows the pumpfun bonding curve. Its horizontal axis is the net SOL invested in the token, z, while the left vertical axis represents total token supply, $y(z) = \beta \log(1 + z)$, and the right vertical axis represents token price, $p(z) = \alpha z^{\gamma}$, $\gamma > 1$, in SOL. The blue curve indicates how supply evolves with net capital injection, whereas the red curve shows the corresponding token price. The dashed vertical marker highlights the migration boundary, around 85 SOL of net investment, making clear that a relatively small net inflow can be sufficient to trigger migration.

Figs. 1(c) and 1(d) explain why this apparently modest threshold can still imply substantial market-wide capital processing. In Fig. 1(c), the horizontal axis is total trading volume per day, measured in SOL, and the vertical axis is net SOL investment, that is, buy volume minus sell volume. Points near the diagonal correspond to stronger net accumulation, whereas points far below it indicate heavy turnover with limited net inflow, revealing trading friction and persistent sell pressure. In Fig. 1(d), the horizontal axis is time in days and the vertical axis is cumulative market capital processed, again in SOL. It illustrates the scale effect: even if each individual token requires only about 85 SOL of net inflow to migrate, the ecosystem as a whole must process a much larger amount of capital over time because repeated buying and selling dissipate much of the flow before it becomes sustained net accumulation.

Empirical data spanning from January to October 2025 reveals a profound temporal compression in the migration process. While the technical requirement for migration remains a net inflow of approximately 85 SOL, the distribution of time to reach this threshold is characterized by extreme positive skewness.

Our analysis shows a median migration time of only 8 minutes, suggesting that for 50% of successful tokens, the migration event is nearly instantaneous and likely driven by pre-coordinated social signals or automated execution platforms. In contrast, the average migration time is $6{,}333$ minutes (approximately 4.4 days).

This vast disparity (a $\sim$ $791\times$ ratio) highlights the existence of a “long tail” of tokens that process volume over extended periods without achieving sustained capital accumulation, further validating the capital dissipation framework.



Figure 1. Aggregate market dynamics of speculative tokens over March 2026 (one-month snapshot). Despite a migration threshold of ∼85 SOL, the ecosystem processes substantially larger volumes due to high turnover and persistent sell pressure.

3.2. Volume and Market Capitalization

A useful heuristic for assessing token health is the relationship between trading volume and market capitalization. Tokens with organic activity typically exhibit volume levels close to or exceeding half of their market capitalization, whereas significantly lower ratios often indicate artificial activity such as wash trading. This relationship is reflected in Figure 1: Figure 1(c) shows the imbalance between buy and sell volumes, highlighting high turnover and sell pressure, while Figure 1(d) illustrates the large amount of capital (in SOL) required to sustain migration at scale despite limited net inflow.

Although the technical requirement for migration is a net liquidity injection of 85 SOL, we define a validation threshold of 170 SOL in total volume (i.e., twice the net liquidity). Figure 1(b) (bonding curve) shows how relatively small net investments can trigger migration, while Figure 1(a) highlights the aggregate scale at which many tokens operate. A volume close to the technical minimum of 85 SOL implies a near 100% buy-to-sell ratio, consistent with self-generated liquidity and coordinated behavior. In contrast, a volume of 170 SOL corresponds to a 1:1 churn ratio, indicating that the required liquidity has been fully turned over through genuine market interactions.

3.3. Network Fees as Signal

Transaction fees provide an additional signal of market authenticity. Genuine demand increases fees due to competition among traders, whereas low fees combined with high reported volume often indicate automated or coordinated activity. In practice, platforms used by active traders impose additional service fees per transaction, so organic activity typically generates well above 1 SOL in cumulative fees even under low network congestion. In contrast, bot-driven volume tends to minimize costs by bypassing these interfaces,



Figure 2. Examples of wallet interaction graphs (Bubblemaps). Dispersed structures indicate decentralized ownership.

Table 2. Validation Thresholds: Technical Minimum vs. Organic Market Activity

Metric	**High Risk (Rug/Bot)**	**Realistic Healthy (Growth)**	**Strong Organic (Moon)**
Total Volume	85–120 SOL	170–250 SOL	400+ SOL
Volume/MC Ratio	$< 30\%$	40%–60%	$> 100\%$
Global Fees (SOL)	< 1 SOL	5–10 SOL	> 10 SOL
Holder Pattern	Centralized Ring	Small Clusters	Organic Dispersion

resulting in near-minimal fees despite high reported trading activity. This divergence between volume and fees provides a useful indicator of artificial market behavior.

3.4. Wallet Clustering and Supply Distribution

Wallet clustering is a key indicator of coordinated behavior. Clusters often reveal that a single entity controls multiple wallets, enabling manipulation of both supply and trading activity. Such coordination typically manifests through recurring interaction patterns and synchronized transactions, which are unlikely to arise under independent participation.

A decentralized token typically exhibits a dispersed ownership structure, whereas a high concentration of supply within a single wallet or tightly connected cluster signals an increased risk of manipulation or rug pulls. Figure 2 illustrates this contrast, showing how organically distributed tokens differ from clustered and centrally controlled ones.

Figure 2 is constructed from transaction and holder data collected from Axiom, where wallets are represented as nodes and interactions (transfers or shared trading activity) as edges, and visualized using clustering tools such as Bubblemaps. The left panels show tokens with dispersed ownership, indicative of more independent participation and healthier market behavior, whereas the right panels display dense, highly interconnected clusters, suggesting concentrated control and coordinated activity. These structural patterns align with the quantitative thresholds in Table 2: high-risk tokens (right) tend to exhibit low total volume (85–120 SOL), low volume-to-market-cap ratios, minimal fees, and centralized ownership, while healthier tokens (left) sustain higher volumes (170+ SOL), generate greater fees, and exhibit more distributed participation. Strongly organic tokens further amplify these characteristics. Together, the figure and the table provide complementary perspectives, linking structural patterns of coordination to measurable indicators of market quality.

Summary: Golden Triangle of Token Validation. We identify three core metrics—volume, fees, and supply distribution—whose joint consistency provides an indicator of organic activity. Volume reflects participation, fees capture competitive demand, and dispersed ownership signals decentralization. When these three signals are aligned, they provide strong evidence of organic market behavior; when they diverge, they often indicate coordinated or artificial activity.

At the same time, speculative token ecosystems remain exposed to structural risks, including mint authority, freeze authority, and liquidity pool control, which enable manipulation of supply and trading conditions. More broadly, commonly used metrics such as volume and market capitalization can be artificially inflated, producing misleading signals of market health. Coordinated activity further undermines the assumption of independent participation, making it difficult to distinguish organic demand from artificial behavior such as wash trading or bot-driven transactions. These challenges highlight the need for improved analytical tools and more transparent, verifiable indicators of market quality.

3.5. Honeypots

Beyond structural indicators, it is essential to verify whether a token is *technically tradable*. Even when the Golden Triangle metrics appear favorable, smart contract mechanisms may prevent users from exiting positions. In particular, *honeypots* are contracts designed to allow buying but restrict or prevent selling, effectively trapping liquidity.

A practical validation procedure combines market signals with contract-level checks. High reported volume should only be considered a positive signal when accompanied by decentralized ownership, as revealed by tools such as Bubblemaps. In particular, *organic dispersion*—where wallet clusters are weakly connected—indicates independent participation, whereas tightly connected clusters linked to deployer wallets suggest coordinated control and elevated risk of insider liquidation.

In addition, contract permissions must be examined carefully. Platforms such as Photon provide automated indicators that summarize key risks:

- **Mint Authority:** Indicates whether the contract owner can mint additional tokens, potentially diluting supply and destabilizing the market.
- **Freeze Authority:** Indicates whether the owner can restrict transfers or selectively allow only certain wallets to sell.
- **LP Burned:** Indicates whether liquidity provider (LP) tokens have been permanently locked or burned, preventing liquidity withdrawal.
- **Top Holder Concentration:** Measures the fraction of supply held by the largest wallets, with high concentration indicating elevated manipulation risk.

These checks are particularly important for tokens deployed directly on AMM platforms such as *Raydium* or *Meteora*, where contract permissions may remain active after deployment [Mohan 2022, Angeris et al. 2019]. In contrast, tokens launched through structured platforms such as *Pump.fun* or *Bonk* typically enforce safer defaults, including revoked mint and freeze authorities and automatically burned liquidity. In such cases, technical risks are reduced, and the analysis can focus more heavily on market-based signals such as volume, fees, and ownership distribution.

4. Analytical Model of Speculative Token Ecosystems

We now formalize the empirical observations introduced in the previous section. We present a mathematical abstraction of speculative-token ecosystems that captures three key features observed empirically: (i) high token arrival rates, (ii) rapid capital dissipation due to churn, and (iii) nonlinear price and supply dynamics induced by bonding curves. For clarity, Table 3 summarizes the notation used in the analytical model.

4.1. Token arrivals, lifetime, and migration

We model token creation as a Poisson process with rate $\lambda > 0$, representing the average number of new tokens per unit time. Each token i has a speculative lifetime $T_i^{(d)} \sim \mathrm{Exp}(\mu)$, where $\mu > 0$ is the decay rate, capturing loss of attention or market exit.

Let $z_i(t) = \int_0^t (b_i(u) - s_i(u))\, du$ denote the retained capital (net inflow) in SOL, where $b_i(t)$ and $s_i(t)$ are buy and sell rates. Migration occurs when $z_i(t) \geq B$, where $B \approx 85$ SOL is the empirical migration threshold. Define the time to migration as $T_i^{(m)} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : z_i(t) \geq B\}$, and the effective lifetime

$$T_i = \min\{T_i^{(m)}, T_i^{(d)}\}.$$

By Little's law, the expected number of active tokens is $L = \lambda \mathbb{E}[T_i]$.

4.2. Gross volume, net inflow, and efficiency

Define cumulative gross volume $V_i(t) = \int_0^t (b_i(u) + s_i(u))\, du$. We introduce the efficiency parameter

$$\theta_i(t) = \frac{b_i(t) - s_i(t)}{b_i(t) + s_i(t)}.$$

Under the approximation $\theta_i(t) \approx \theta_i \in (0, 1]$,

$$\frac{dz_i}{dt} = \theta_i \frac{dV_i}{dt}, \qquad z_i(t) = \theta_i V_i(t).$$

Let $V_i^\star$ denote the *required migration volume* of token i, defined as the minimum gross trading volume necessary for the token to reach the migration threshold B. Since only a fraction θ_i of the gross trading volume translates into net capital accumulation, the net inflow satisfies $z_i = \theta_i V_i$. Therefore, the migration condition $z_i \geq B$ implies

$$V_i^\star = \frac{B}{\theta_i}.$$

Key implication. The required volume grows inversely with efficiency. Thus, $1/\theta_i$ quantifies the inflation factor between gross trading activity and effective capital accumulation. When θ_i is small, most trades cancel out through speculative churn, and substantially larger gross volume is required to achieve the same net inflow. In contrast, when θ_i is close to one, trading activity translates almost entirely into retained capital, and migration can be achieved with relatively little volume. This relation quantifies capital dissipation: low θ_i implies large gross volume is required to achieve a fixed net inflow.

4.3. Bonding curve dynamics

The platform enforces a bonding curve where retained capital determines both price and supply:

$$p(z) = \alpha z^\gamma, \quad \gamma > 1, \qquad y(z) = \beta \log(1 + z).$$

Table 3. Notation used in the analytical model.

Symbol	Description	Symbol	Description
t	Time	i	Token index
B	Migration threshold ($\approx$ 85 SOL)	$b_i(t)$, $s_i(t)$	Buy and sell rates
$V_i(t)$	Cumulative trading volume	$z_i(t)$	Net capital (retained inflow)
θ_i	Efficiency (net-to-gross conversion)	$V_i^\star$	Required volume, B/θ_i
$\mathcal{A}(t)$	Set of active tokens	$G(t)$, $U(t)$	Aggregate volume and net inflow
$\Theta(t)$	Ecosystem efficiency (U/G)	$p(z)$, $y(z)$	Price and supply functions
α, β, γ	Bonding curve parameters	λ	Token arrival rate
μ	Token decay rate	ν_i	Trading rate (dV_i/dt)
$T_i^{(m)}$	Migration time	$T_i^{(d)}$	Decay time

Using the chain rule:

$$\frac{dp_i}{dt} = \alpha\gamma z_i^{\gamma-1}\frac{dz_i}{dt}, \qquad \frac{dy_i}{dt} = \frac{\beta}{1+z_i}\frac{dz_i}{dt}.$$

Per unit of gross volume:

$$\frac{dp_i}{dV_i} = \alpha\gamma z_i^{\gamma-1}\theta_i, \qquad \frac{dy_i}{dV_i} = \frac{\beta}{1+z_i}\theta_i.$$

Implications. The bonding-curve structure induces asymmetric dynamics in price and supply. In particular, the marginal price impact increases with the retained capital z_i due to the convexity of $p(z)$, while the marginal token issuance decreases with z_i due to the concavity of $y(z)$. As a consequence, late-stage inflows have a disproportionately large effect on price while contributing relatively little to additional supply. This leads to an acceleration of price dynamics near the migration threshold, even when the underlying capital accumulation remains limited. Thus, price acceleration near migration is a structural consequence of the bonding curve.

4.4. Migration time and probability

Table 4. Migration Statistics and Temporal Distribution (January 1, 2025 to October 31, 2025). The median migration time is 8 minutes, while the mean is 6,333 minutes, revealing a highly skewed distribution with a long tail of tokens that fail to accumulate capital efficiently.

Summary Statistics		Distribution of Time to Migration		
Metric	**Value (min)**	**Range**	**Count (N)**	**Percent**
Total Tokens	49,010	0–1 min	10,739	21.91%
Mean	6,320.31	1–5 min	9,903	20.21%
Median	8.00	5–10 min	5,131	10.47%
Minimum	0.00	10–30 min	7,500	15.30%
Maximum	1,051,200.00	30–60 min	2,404	4.91%
Percentile 10 (P_{10})	0.17	1–6 h	6,893	14.06%
Percentile 25 (P_{25})	1.00	6–24 h	2,434	4.97%
Percentile 75 (P_{75})	60.00	1–7 d	1,801	3.67%
Percentile 90 (P_{90})	840.00	7 d+	2,205	4.50%
Percentile 95 (P_{95})	5,760.00	**Total**	**49,010**	**100.00%**

Assume constant gross trading rate: $dV_i/dt = \nu_i$. Then $z_i(t) = \theta_i \nu_i t$ and $T_i^{(m)}$ is constant, $T_i^{(m)} = B/(\theta_i \nu_i)$. With exponential lifetime, $T_i^{(d)} \sim \mathrm{Exp}(\mu)$, the migration probability is $\mathbb{P}(T_i^{(m)} < T_i^{(d)}) = \exp(-\mu B/(\theta_i \nu_i))$.

Comparative statics. The migration probability decreases with the threshold B and the decay rate μ, as higher required capital or faster loss of attention reduces the likelihood of reaching migration. Conversely, it increases with the efficiency θ_i and the gross trading rate ν_i, since higher activity and more effective conversion of volume into net inflow both accelerate capital accumulation and improve the chances of migrating before decay. Thus, success requires both activity and efficiency.

The observed gap between the median and mean migration times, summarized in Table 4, provides a critical calibration point for the decay rate μ and the efficiency parameter θ_i. A median of 8 minutes implies that the speculative lifetime $T_i^{(d)}$ is extremely narrow for the majority of participants.

Under these conditions, the migration probability $\mathbb{P}(T_i^{(m)} < T_i^{(d)})$ is maximized only for tokens that exhibit near-perfect efficiency ($\theta_i \approx 1$) or massive initial trading rates ν_i. Tokens that fail to migrate within this initial window of attention are subjected to prolonged ecosystem friction, as represented by the significantly higher mean time.

In this regime, the required volume V^* increases inversely with the decaying efficiency θ_i.

4.5. Aggregate ecosystem dynamics

Let $\mathcal{A}(t)$ be the set of active tokens. Define the *aggregate gross trading activity*, which captures the total volume processed by the system, and the *aggregate net capital inflow*, which captures the effective capital accumulation, as

$$G(t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}(t)} (b_i(t) + s_i(t)), \quad U(t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{A}(t)} (b_i(t) - s_i(t)).$$

Then, the ecosystem efficiency is given by:

$$\Theta(t) = U(t)/G(t).$$

Let $F(t)$ be the ecosystem dissipation, $F(t) = G(t) - U(t)$. The corresponding cumulative quantities by time T are given by $\mathcal{G}(T) = \int_0^T G(t)\,dt$ and $\mathcal{U}(T) = \int_0^T U(t)\,dt$. A dissipative system satisfies $\mathcal{U}(T) \ll \mathcal{G}(T)$, meaning that only a small fraction of the processed capital is retained as net accumulation, while the majority is dissipated through speculative churn, reversals, and repeated trading activity.

4.6. Empirical Calibration and Implications

We now connect the analytical model with empirical observations from March 2026. The platform generated approximately $25{,}127$ tokens, of which only 645 reached migration, yielding a success rate of about 2.56%. At the same time, daily trading activity was extremely high, with average buy and sell volumes of approximately $437{,}670$ and $477{,}318$ SOL, respectively. This results in a large gross volume of about $914{,}988$ SOL per day, but a negative net flow of approximately $-39{,}648$ SOL, indicating that the system processes substantial capital while retaining very little.

This discrepancy is captured by the efficiency parameter Θ, noting that the system has negative net accumulation, with magnitude about 4.3% of gross volume. In other words, only about 4.3% of the traded capital contributes to net flow (in absolute value), while the remainder is dissipated through churn. This provides a quantitative characterization of the system as highly inefficient in converting trading activity into sustained capital accumulation.

The analytical relation $V^\star = B/\theta$ provides a direct interpretation of these observations. Since only a fraction θ of gross trading volume contributes to net inflow, the total volume required to reach the migration threshold $B \approx 85$ SOL scales inversely with efficiency. When $\theta \approx 1$, migration can be achieved with minimal volume, corresponding to near-pure accumulation. When $\theta \approx 0.5$, the required volume doubles to about 170 SOL, reflecting balanced buy and sell activity and sustained participation. For smaller values, such as $\theta \approx 0.2$, the required volume increases to over 400 SOL, indicating environments where most trading activity is dissipative.

These regimes align closely with the empirical thresholds observed in practice: low-volume tokens (85–120 SOL) are typically associated with coordinated or artificial activity, intermediate volumes (heuristically set as 170–250 SOL) correspond to healthier market participation, and high volumes (400+ SOL) indicate strong organic demand. At the ecosystem level, however, the effective efficiency is much lower ($\theta \approx 0.0433$), implying a required volume on the order of 2000 SOL to achieve migration. This highlights a key asymmetry: while successful tokens operate in relatively efficient regimes, the aggregate system is highly dissipative.

The bonding curve further amplifies these effects. Since price grows convexly with retained capital, while supply grows concavely, late-stage inflows have a disproportionately large impact on price while contributing relatively little additional supply. As a result, tokens approaching migration may exhibit sharp price increases despite modest underlying capital accumulation. This creates the appearance of strong momentum even in environments dominated by churn.

Overall, the system behaves as a high-turnover, low-efficiency market in which most capital is continuously recycled rather than accumulated. Migration requires not only sufficient trading activity but also a favorable balance between buys and sells, as captured by θ. The combination of capital dissipation and nonlinear price dynamics explains how large trading volumes can coexist with low migration rates and limited effective capital formation.

5. Related Work

Prior work on speculative crypto markets can be grouped into five main streams: wash trading in decentralized exchanges, MEV and frontrunning, AMM and bonding-curve models, memecoin and speculative-token studies, and wallet clustering/deanonymization.

Wash trading on decentralized exchanges. [Victor and Weintraud 2021] show that decentralized exchanges are vulnerable to wash trading, where the same actor or coordinated actors create artificial trading activity. Their work focuses on detecting manipulative trade structures in DEX data. Our work is complementary: rather than identifying wash trades ex post, we study how speculative-token platforms produce market conditions in which inflated volume, low net capital accumulation, and clustered ownership can coexist. The efficiency parameter θ provides a compact way to quantify how much reported volume is converted into effective capital inflow.

MEV, frontrunning, and execution-layer competition. [Daian et al. 2020] analyze frontrunning and miner-extractable value in decentralized exchanges, showing how transaction ordering and automated bots create new forms of financial extraction. Our setting shares the presence of bots and low-latency execution, but differs in emphasis. We do not focus on transaction ordering attacks; instead, we examine speculative-token launch platforms where execution speed, social signals, and bonding curves jointly shape capital accumulation before migration.

AMMs and bonding-curve models. A large body of work studies automated market makers, especially constant-product markets such as Uniswap [Angeris et al. 2019, Mohan 2022]. These works formalize pricing, liquidity provision, and arbitrage in mature decentralized exchanges. Our analysis differs because the pre-migration speculative platforms considered here do not behave like standard LP-provided AMMs. Instead, they use deterministic bonding curves in which price is a function of retained capital. This distinction is central: in our model, price grows convexly with retained capital while supply grows concavely, which can create sharp price movements even when net capital accumulation remains limited.

Memecoins and speculative tokens. Recent work in political economy and critical blockchain studies analyzes speculative tokens as assets driven by hype, regulatory arbitrage, and extraction rather than fundamental value [Copelovitch and Pepinsky 2026, Howson 2023]. These studies help explain why such markets emerge and why they attract participation. Our contribution is more microstructural: we study the platforms that mediate speculative trading and show how their design produces measurable signatures such as high turnover, low efficiency, fee-volume inconsistencies, and concentrated ownership.

Wallet clustering and blockchain deanonymization. Blockchain measurement studies have shown that wallet interactions can reveal common ownership, coordinated behavior, and hidden concentration. [Meiklejohn et al. 2013] demonstrate how transaction-graph analysis can be used to cluster Bitcoin addresses. We build on this perspective by treating wallet clustering as one component of market validation. In our setting, ownership dispersion must be interpreted jointly with volume and fees. This motivates the Golden Triangle of Token Validation, which combines trading activity, fee generation, and wallet distribution to distinguish organic participation from coordinated behavior.

Overall, existing work provides tools for understanding manipulation, competition [Altman et al. 2019], AMM pricing, speculative demand, and address clustering. However, these threads have largely been studied separately. This paper connects them in the specific context of speculative-token trading platforms, where bonding curves, social signals, execution tools, and wallet coordination interact before token migration.

6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Empirical data from January to October 2025 shows that successful tokens migrate very quickly. Although migration requires a net inflow of approximately 85 SOL, the distribution of migration times is highly skewed, with a median of 8 minutes and a mean of 6,333 minutes. This gap indicates that success is concentrated in a short initial window, likely associated with automated execution and pre-coordinated signals, whereas most tokens experience prolonged churn and fail to accumulate capital efficiently.

These observations are consistent with the analytical framework. As the efficiency parameter θ decreases, the volume required for migration increases, often exceeding available liquidity during the decay phase. This explains why standard indicators such as 24-hour trading volume can be misleading. Instead, the *Golden Triangle of Token Validation*, combining volume, fees, and ownership distribution, provides a more reliable signal of organic activity, particularly at short migration timescales.

Overall, speculative-token platforms induce a “high-velocity, low-accumulation” environment through the tight coupling of social signals and execution engines. While our analysis focuses on the Solana ecosystem, the underlying mechanisms of bonding curves and capital churn are likely to generalize to other high-frequency DeFi environments. Future work should examine how fee structures and latency in Layer 2 and EVM-compatible systems affect the efficiency of decentralized capital accumulation.

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