A Receipt-Free i-Voting System Based on Blind Signatures and Anonymous IDs
Resumo
In this paper, we propose an i-voting scheme based on blind signatures, with a mechanism to prevent voters from generating vote proofs. The scheme combines blind signatures of the ballots with anonymous IDs also blindly signed by the election authority. After the election is closed, the list of ballots and corresponding signatures is published by the election authority, allowing any interested party to check the integrity of the result.
Referências
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Cranor, L. and Cytron, R. (1996). Design and implementation of a practical security-conscious electronic pollind system. Technical report, Washington University.
Davenport, Ben, A. N. and Woodard, J. (2000). Creating a secure digital voting protocol for campus elections. [link].
Diffie, W. and Hellman, M. E. (1976). New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22:644–654.
DuRene, B. (1999). Multiple administrators for electronic voting. [link].
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., and Ohta, K. (1993). A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In Seberry, J. and Zheng, Y., editors, Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT ’92, pages 244–251, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Ibrahim, S., Kamat, M., Salleh, M., and Aziz, S. R. A. (2003). Secure e-voting with blind signature. In 4th National Conference of Telecommunication Technology, 2003. NCTT 2003 Proceedings., pages 193–197.
Kucharczyk, M. (2010). Blind signatures in electronic voting systems. In Kwiecień, A., Gaj, P., and Stera, P., editors, Computer Networks, pages 349–358, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Ohkubo, M., Miura, F., Abe, M., Fujioka, A., and Okamoto, T. (1999). An improvement on a practical secret voting scheme. In Information Security, pages 225–234, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Radwin, M. J. (1995). An untraceable, universally verifiable voting scheme. Seminar In Cryptology.
Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21:120–126.
Cranor, L. and Cytron, R. (1996). Design and implementation of a practical security-conscious electronic pollind system. Technical report, Washington University.
Davenport, Ben, A. N. and Woodard, J. (2000). Creating a secure digital voting protocol for campus elections. [link].
Diffie, W. and Hellman, M. E. (1976). New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22:644–654.
DuRene, B. (1999). Multiple administrators for electronic voting. [link].
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., and Ohta, K. (1993). A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In Seberry, J. and Zheng, Y., editors, Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT ’92, pages 244–251, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Ibrahim, S., Kamat, M., Salleh, M., and Aziz, S. R. A. (2003). Secure e-voting with blind signature. In 4th National Conference of Telecommunication Technology, 2003. NCTT 2003 Proceedings., pages 193–197.
Kucharczyk, M. (2010). Blind signatures in electronic voting systems. In Kwiecień, A., Gaj, P., and Stera, P., editors, Computer Networks, pages 349–358, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Ohkubo, M., Miura, F., Abe, M., Fujioka, A., and Okamoto, T. (1999). An improvement on a practical secret voting scheme. In Information Security, pages 225–234, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Radwin, M. J. (1995). An untraceable, universally verifiable voting scheme. Seminar In Cryptology.
Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21:120–126.
Publicado
25/10/2018
Como Citar
BARROS, Charles F. de; PIMENTA, Diego F..
A Receipt-Free i-Voting System Based on Blind Signatures and Anonymous IDs. In: SIMPÓSIO BRASILEIRO DE CIBERSEGURANÇA (SBSEG), 18. , 2018, Natal.
Anais [...].
Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação,
2018
.
p. 449-456.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2018.4277.
