Execução de código arbitrário na urna eletrônica brasileira

• Diego F. Aranha Unicamp / UFCG / Hekima / UFPE / UFSCar
• Pedro Barbosa Unicamp / UFCG / Hekima / UFPE / UFSCar
• Thiago N. C. Cardoso Unicamp / UFCG / Hekima / UFPE / UFSCar
• Caio Lüders Unicamp / UFCG / Hekima / UFPE / UFSCar
• Paulo Matias Unicamp / UFCG / Hekima / UFPE / UFSCar

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2018.4243

Abstract

Multiple serious vulnerabilities were detected during the last Public Security Tests of the Brazilian voting system. When combined, they allowed to compromise the main security properties of the system, namely ballot secrecy and software integrity. The insecure storage of cryptographic keys, hard-coded directly in source code and shared among all machines, allowed full content inspection of the software installation memory cards, after which two shared libraries missing authentication signatures were detected. Injecting code in those libraries opened the possibility of having complete control over the machine. As far as we know, this was the most in-depth exploitation of an official large-scale voting system ever performed during severely restricted tests.

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