Computer Security by Hardware-Intrinsic Authentication

  • Caio Hoffman UNICAMP
  • Diego F. Aranha UNICAMP / Aarhus University
  • Mario Lúcio Côrtes UNICAMP
  • Guido Costa Souza de Araújo UNICAMP

Resumo


The Internet of Things (IoT) has brought evident security concerns. New solutions in security for IoT will need to reduce the dependency on nonvolatile memory for key storage, promote easier means to uniquely identify billions of devices, etc. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been adopted as the future for key derivation and hardware fingerprinting. This work presents CSHIA: a new computer architecture that takes into account limitations and strengths of PUFs to provide code and data integrity and authenticity in a seamless design that does not demand changes in processors microarchitecture or software. We describe and analyze a full-fledged FPGA deployment of the architecture and consider attack scenarios, including side-channel attacks on PUFs.

Referências

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Publicado
13/10/2020
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HOFFMAN, Caio; ARANHA, Diego F.; CÔRTES, Mario Lúcio; ARAÚJO, Guido Costa Souza de. Computer Security by Hardware-Intrinsic Authentication. In: CONCURSO DE TESES E DISSERTAÇÕES - SIMPÓSIO BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA DA INFORMAÇÃO E DE SISTEMAS COMPUTACIONAIS (SBSEG), 20. , 2020, Evento Online. Anais [...]. Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2020 . p. 9-16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2020.19264.