Implementation Attacks on ML-KEM: Analysis, Practical Assessment, and Recommendations

• Vitor Hugo Galhardo Moia Instituto de Pesquisas Eldorado
• Kevin Pires Novaes Instituto de Pesquisas Eldorado
• Vinicius de Paula Rossetto Instituto de Pesquisas Eldorado

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2026.33066

Resumo

ML-KEM is the NIST-standardized key encapsulation mechanism derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber, a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm designed to provide security against both classical and quantum computers. However, implementation attacks threaten the adoption of this algorithm, specially in constrained environments (e.g., IoT, OT/ICS, and other embedded applications). In this work, we present an analysis of Side-Channel and Fault Injection attacks, demonstrating which algorithm operations are targeted by adversaries, practical experiments to detect side-channel leakage, adversary capabilities required to perform attacks, and recommendations for securing implementations.

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