Contração Seletiva: um modelo hiperintensional para mudança de crenças
Resumo
A teoria de revisão de crença AGM provou ser uma abordagem frutífera para o estudo da mudança de crenças, mas com pouca flexibilidade para investigar fenômenos epistêmicos importantes. Em particular, enquanto as crenças são comumente aceitas como atitudes hiperintensionais, a literatura influenciada por AGM tem se concentrado principalmente em tratamentos intensionais de crenças. Neste trabalho, investigamos operações de mudança de crença hiperintensionais baseadas em uma semântica de mundos impossíveis e mostrando uma forte conexão com operações bem estabelecidas na literatura.Referências
Alchourrón, C. E., Gärdenfors, P., and Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2):510–530.
Berto, F. (2019). Simple hyperintensional belief revision. Erkenntnis, 84(3):559–575.
Berto, F. and Hawke, P. (2021). Knowability relative to information. Mind, 130(517):1–33.
Bozdag, S. (2021). A semantics for hyperintensional belief revision based on information bases. Studia Logica, pages 1–38.
Cresswell, M. J. (1972). Intensional logics and logical truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1(1):2–15.
Cresswell, M. J. (1975). Hyperintensional logic. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 34(1):25–38.
Gärdenfors, P. (1991). Belief revision and nonmonotonic logic: two sides of the same coin? Logics in AI, pages 52–54.
Hansson, S. O. (1991). Belief contraction without recovery. Studia logica, 50(2):251–260.
Hansson, S. O. and Wassermann, R. (2002). Local change. Studia Logica, 70(1):49–76.
Jago, M. (2014). The impossible: An essay on hyperintensionality. OUP Oxford.
Leitgeb, H. (2019). HYPE: A system of hyperintensional logic (with an application to semantic paradoxes). Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48(2):305–405.
Lindström, S. and Rabinowicz, W. (1999). DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents. Erkenntnis, 50(2):353–385.
Nolan, D. (2014). Hyperintensional metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 171(1):149–160.
Rantala, V. (1982). Impossible worlds semantics and logical omniscience. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 35:106–115.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2021). Belief contraction in non-classical logics as hyperintensional belief change. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, volume 18, pages 588–598.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2022a). Hyperintensional models and belief change. In Intelligent Systems: 11th Brazilian Conference, BRACIS 2022, Campinas, Brazil, November 28–December 1, 2022, Proceedings, Part I, pages 429–443. Springer.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2022b). Hyperintensional partial meet contractions. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In Ifs, pages 41–55. Springer.
Williams, M.-A. (1995). Iterated theory base change: A computational model. In Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial intelligence, pages 1541–1547.
Özgün, A. and Berto, F. (2020). Dynamic hyperintensional belief revision. The Review of Symbolic Logic, page 1–46.
Berto, F. (2019). Simple hyperintensional belief revision. Erkenntnis, 84(3):559–575.
Berto, F. and Hawke, P. (2021). Knowability relative to information. Mind, 130(517):1–33.
Bozdag, S. (2021). A semantics for hyperintensional belief revision based on information bases. Studia Logica, pages 1–38.
Cresswell, M. J. (1972). Intensional logics and logical truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1(1):2–15.
Cresswell, M. J. (1975). Hyperintensional logic. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 34(1):25–38.
Gärdenfors, P. (1991). Belief revision and nonmonotonic logic: two sides of the same coin? Logics in AI, pages 52–54.
Hansson, S. O. (1991). Belief contraction without recovery. Studia logica, 50(2):251–260.
Hansson, S. O. and Wassermann, R. (2002). Local change. Studia Logica, 70(1):49–76.
Jago, M. (2014). The impossible: An essay on hyperintensionality. OUP Oxford.
Leitgeb, H. (2019). HYPE: A system of hyperintensional logic (with an application to semantic paradoxes). Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48(2):305–405.
Lindström, S. and Rabinowicz, W. (1999). DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents. Erkenntnis, 50(2):353–385.
Nolan, D. (2014). Hyperintensional metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 171(1):149–160.
Rantala, V. (1982). Impossible worlds semantics and logical omniscience. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 35:106–115.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2021). Belief contraction in non-classical logics as hyperintensional belief change. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, volume 18, pages 588–598.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2022a). Hyperintensional models and belief change. In Intelligent Systems: 11th Brazilian Conference, BRACIS 2022, Campinas, Brazil, November 28–December 1, 2022, Proceedings, Part I, pages 429–443. Springer.
Souza, M. and Wassermann, R. (2022b). Hyperintensional partial meet contractions. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In Ifs, pages 41–55. Springer.
Williams, M.-A. (1995). Iterated theory base change: A computational model. In Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial intelligence, pages 1541–1547.
Özgün, A. and Berto, F. (2020). Dynamic hyperintensional belief revision. The Review of Symbolic Logic, page 1–46.
Publicado
06/08/2023
Como Citar
SOUZA, Marlo.
Contração Seletiva: um modelo hiperintensional para mudança de crenças. In: WORKSHOP BRASILEIRO DE LÓGICA (WBL), 4. , 2023, João Pessoa/PB.
Anais [...].
Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação,
2023
.
p. 41-48.
ISSN 2763-8731.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/wbl.2023.230564.
