Effects of Reward Distribution Strategies in Agent-Based Coalitions: Preliminary Results

  • Luís Gustavo Ludescher USP
  • Jaime Simão Sichman USP

Abstract


In a typical political system in which leaders are responsible for distribution of benefits among people, coalitions are usually formed in which some individuals, seeking to serve their own interests, support the emergence of certain leaders. The purpose of this work is to evaluate the dynamics of coalition formation and distribution of rewards in such a context. Using agent-based simulation, we evaluate a model in which three leader profiles are considered and individuals seek to maximize their earnings either by participating or not in coalitions. The preliminary results indicate that egoist leaders encourage the formation of more coalitions and promote more imbalances.

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Published
2019-05-02
LUDESCHER, Luís Gustavo; SICHMAN, Jaime Simão. Effects of Reward Distribution Strategies in Agent-Based Coalitions: Preliminary Results. In: WORKSHOP-SCHOOL ON AGENTS, ENVIRONMENTS, AND APPLICATIONS (WESAAC), 13. , 2019, Florianópolis/SC. Anais [...]. Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2019 . p. 83-94. ISSN 2326-5434. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/wesaac.2019.33342.