An Empirical Study on the Blocking of HTTP and DNS Requests at Providers Level to Counter In-The-Wild Malware Infections

  • Marcus Botacin UFPR
  • Paulo de Geus UNICAMP
  • André Grégio UFPR

Abstract


Although blocking samples at endpoint level is still essential to respond to newly created threats, large-scale threat blocking is only possible at network level. We propose investigating how such blocking procedures take place in actual scenarios aiming to identify and bridge existing development gaps. We considered daily analysis results of two malware datasets (representatives of the Brazilian and the World scenarios) and investigate the prevalence and the methods leveraged to make the downloaded HTTP payloads and the resolved DNS domains unavailable to the malware samples. We discovered that: (i) The servers contacted by all samples are sinkholed in similar ways, but Brazilian samples were first affected; (ii) cloud-stored samples are blocked in distinct manners than the ones stored in private servers; (iii) blocking DNS resolution of malicious domains is more efficient than blocking individual HTTP-retrieved payloads; and (iv) there is still open development gaps in network security as most samples had no contacted domain sinkholed at any time.

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Published
2020-10-13
BOTACIN, Marcus; GEUS, Paulo de; GRÉGIO, André. An Empirical Study on the Blocking of HTTP and DNS Requests at Providers Level to Counter In-The-Wild Malware Infections. In: BRAZILIAN SYMPOSIUM ON CYBERSECURITY (SBSEG), 20. , 2020, Petrópolis. Anais [...]. Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2020 . p. 188-200. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2020.19237.

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