Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan

  • Jeroen van de Graaf UFMG

Resumo


We describe a variation of Prêt-à-Voter that keeps the same ballot layout but borrows and slightly modifies the underlying cryptographic primitives from Punchscan, substituting the mix network for bit commitments.

Referências

Bryans, J. and Ryan, P. A dependability analysis of the Chaum Voting Scheme. Technical Report CS-TR-809, University of Newcastle, 2003.

Chaum, D. Secret-Ballot receipts: True Voter-Verifiable elections. IEEE Security and Privacy, 2(1):38-47, Jan/Feb 2004.

Ryan, P.Y.A. A Variant of the Chaum Voting Scheme. Technical Report CS-TR-864, University of Newcastle, 2004. Also Proceedings of the Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security(ACM), 2005. pg 81-88.

Hosp, B., Popovenuic, S. Punchscan Voting Summary. Version dated Feb 13, 2006, obtained from first author.

Jakobsson, M., Juels, A. and Rivest, R. Making Mix Nets Robust For Electronic Voting By Randomized Partial Checking. Usenix 2002.

Popovenuic, S., Hosp, B. An Introduction to Punchscan. Version dated Oct 15, 2006. [link].
Publicado
27/08/2007
VAN DE GRAAF, Jeroen. Merging Prêt-à-Voter and PunchScan. In: SIMPÓSIO BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA DA INFORMAÇÃO E DE SISTEMAS COMPUTACIONAIS (SBSEG), 7. , 2007, Rio de Janeiro. Anais [...]. Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2007 . p. 257-260. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2007.20934.

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