QUIC-Tr4ck: Mitigando Ataques QUIC-Flood usando Planos de Dados Programáveis
Abstract
The QUIC protocol aims to improve the performance of Web applications, allowing the establishment of multiplexed connections over the UDP protocol. However, with the popularization of QUIC-based services, these have become the target of malicious attacks, mainly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Although there are already solutions to mitigate attacks against QUIC that operate on endpoints, solutions based on programmable data planes (PDP) to detect and mitigate attacks against the QUIC protocol are not largely investigated. In this paper, we present QUIC-Tr4ck, a system for tracking QUIC packets using a hybrid approach that combines programmable data planes (using P4 and sketches) with an SDN controller (consolidating snapshots for a more holistic network state analysis). QUIC-Tr4ck allows switches to intercept QUIC connections and identify malicious clients proactively and preemptively, that is, before they exhaust a server’s resources.
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