MIRAK: An Artifact for Strengthening the Relying Party RPKI Environment

• Yuri de Abreu de Melo IME
• Frederico Sauer G. Oliveira UERJ
• Hugo Batalha Moreno UERJ
• Anderson Fernandes Pereira dos Santos IME / Venturus Centro de Inovação Tecnológica
• Ronaldo Moreira Salles IME / IPP

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2025.11403

Abstract

Route validation through Routinator and the RPKI protocol has been discussed in the literature as the main approach to strengthening BGP routing. However, some studies have highlighted potential attack vectors targeting the route validator itself, justifying efforts to enhance the resilience of this solution. This article presents the MIRAK application, developed with proprietary techniques for low resource consumption and high speed, which automatically identifies vulnerabilities in Routinator, contributing to reduced attack risk. Initial results have been promising, encouraging further study to improve its efficiency and scope.

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