Validation of RPKI solution for BGP security

  • Yuri de Abreu de Melo IME
  • Ronaldo Moreira Salles IME
  • Frederico Sauer G. Oliveira UERJ

Abstract


BGP is vital for the interconnection of Internet Autonomous Systems, and the number of prefix hijacking attacks is increasing. Among the solutions discussed in the literature, RPKI has been the preferred option. The objective of this work is to validate the RPKI, through robustness tests against Prefix Hijacking attacks. The results were satisfactory, since the solution allowed the identification of unauthenticated routes. However, during the research, an RPKI resource that could be used in attacks, the SLURM FILE, was identified and tested. No works were found addressing this possibility, which is the main contribution of the dissertation.

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Published
2022-09-12
DE MELO, Yuri de Abreu; SALLES, Ronaldo Moreira; OLIVEIRA, Frederico Sauer G.. Validation of RPKI solution for BGP security. In: THESIS AND DISSERTATION COMPETITION - BRAZILIAN SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION AND COMPUTATIONAL SYSTEMS SECURITY (SBSEG), 22. , 2022, Santa Maria. Anais [...]. Porto Alegre: Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, 2022 . p. 41-48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2022.225301.