Autenticação baseada em ondas eletromagnéticas

• Ivo Carlson UFMG
• Max Gonzaga UFMG
• Leonardo Oliveira UFMG
• Heitor Ramos UFMG

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2019.14012

Abstract

The rising moment in the use of smart devices brings up concerns about the security of the information exchanged. Authentication methods allow us to verify the provenance of a message. A way of authenticating a message is using the fingerprint of the device. Like humans, smart devices presents differences between them, that comes from the impossibility of manufacture two identicals devices. Once this device is used to generate some kind of media, these differences can be seen on the result. Those features that come along with the generated media can be used to fingerprint the device. In this paper we used Arduinos, typical IoT devices, to generate a signal and a Software Defined Radio to listen to it. The signal was then studied looking for features that could be used to fingerprint each device and then, develop an authentication method between IoT devices and a server.

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