A Implementação de um Protocolo Criptográfico para Geração Distribuída de Credenciais no Sistema CIVIS

• Matheus de Sá UFPA
• Roberto Araújo UFPA

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2019.14007

Abstract

The Internet election system CIVIS is based on a cryptographic voting protocol that enables resistance to coercive attacks. For this, it uses the idea of credentials. A credential consists of a set of bits that must be generated by a set of electoral authorities and delivered to each voter in secrecy. Otherwise, the protocol does not guarantee resistance to coercive attacks. In the current version of the CIVIS system, however, each credential is generated by single electoral authority. As a consequence, the system relies on this authority to be trusted to ensure secure credential generation. In this context, this work presents an implementation of a protocol for the distributed generation of credentials in order to make credential generation more secure in the CIVIS system.

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