Quantificando Vazamento de Informação sobre Estratégias

• Mário S. Alvim UFMG
• Piotr Mardziel University of Maryland
• Michael Hicks University of Maryland

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/etc.2016.9840

Abstract

The field of quantitative information flow concerns the rigorous mathematical assessment of the amount of secret information leaked by computational systems. We report first steps towards a formal model for strategic leakage. We generalize the representation of prior adversarial knowledge from a distribution on secrets to a distribution on strategies for generating secrets, which we call an environment. Applying information-theoretic techniques to environments allows us to disentangle information leakage about a secret from leakage about how users generate secrets, i.e., their strategy.

 

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