Detecção de ataques por ROP em tempo real assistida por hardware

  • Marcus Botacin Unicamp
  • Paulo Lício de Geus Unicamp
  • André Grégio UFPR

Resumo

A injeção de código foi um dos principais ataques contra sistemas computacionais. A adoção das páginas não-executáveis com apoio de hardware (NX/XD) e prevenção de execução de dados (DEP) eliminou o problema na prática. Entretanto, os atacantes passaram a desviar o fluxo de controle legítimo, encadeando blocos de código (gadgets) via instruções de retorno. Tal técnica, a Programação Orientada à Retorno (ROP), tornou-se o principal vetor de injeção. Recentemente, abordagens baseadas em integridade do fluxo de controle (CFI) e comprimento de gadgets surgiram para tratar tais ataques. Propomos aqui um sistema assistido por hardware, construído sobre sistemas Windows, que supera limitações de abordagens da literatura na detecção de ataques por ROP em tempo real.

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Publicado
2016-11-07
Como Citar
BOTACIN, Marcus; GEUS, Paulo Lício de; GRÉGIO, André. Detecção de ataques por ROP em tempo real assistida por hardware. Anais do Simpósio Brasileiro de Segurança da Informação e de Sistemas Computacionais (SBSeg), [S.l.], p. 324-337, nov. 2016. ISSN 0000-0000. Disponível em: <https://sol.sbc.org.br/index.php/sbseg/article/view/19317>. Acesso em: 18 maio 2024. doi: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2016.19317.

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