Uma Técnica de Análise Estática para Detecção de Canais Laterais Baseados em Tempo

• Bruno R. Silva UFMG
• Diego Aranha UNICAMP
• Fernando M. Q. Pereira UFMG

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2015.20082

Abstract

A time-based side-channel is a vulnerability related to implementations of cryptographic systems which allow an adversary to obtain secret information through detailed observations of a program's execution time. Masking and type systems have been proposed as strategies to mitigate this problem. This article proposes an alternative approach focused on static information flow analysis. We have applied it in NaCl and portions of the OpenSSL library where it was possible to validate the good quality of NaCl and to report several vulnerable traces in OpenSSL.

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