S-MOVL: Protegendo Sistemas Computacionais contra Ataques de Violação de Memória por meio de Instruções em Hardware

• Antonio L. Maia Neto UFMG
• Omar P. Vilela Neto UFMG
• Fernando M. Q. Pereira UFMG
• Leonardo B. Oliveira UFMG

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2014.20140

Abstract

The C programming language does not prevent ouf-of-bounds memory access and thus gives room to attacks such as buffer overflow and buffer overread. There exist several techniques to secure C programs. Nevertheless, these methods are usually implemented via software and therefore tend to slow down programs and frequently compromise performance of applications. This work aims at presenting a hardware solution able to check bounds efficiently.

References

Bryant, R. and David Richard, O. (2003). Computer systems: a programmer’s perspective. Prentice Hall.

Dhurjati, D., Kowshik, S., and Adve, V. (2006). SAFECode: enforcing alias analysis for weakly typed languages. In ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation (PLDI ’06), pages 144–157.

Intel Corporation (2013). Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programing Reference. http://download-software.intel.com/sites/default/files/319433-015.pdf.

Piromsopa, K. and Enbody, R. J. (2006). Secure bit: Transparent, hardware bufferoverflow protection. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 3(4):365–376.