Aplicação Dinâmica de Políticas Estáticas de Fluxo

• Carina Capelão de Oliveira UFMG
• Glauco Gonçalves Cardoso PRODEMGE
• Fernando Magno Quintão Pereira UFMG

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2017.19496

Abstract

Information flow analysis is today one of the most important techniques to find vulnerabilities in programs. Since its conception, this technique has evolved to achieve great precision and scalability. However, being static, information flow analysis has one shortcoming: to ensure soundness, it must conservatively refuse some programs which are well-known to be safe. Even exponential-time algorithms cannot change this scenario, as long as they remain static. To address this problem, in this paper we propose a combination of static analysis with dynamic checks to increase the precision of information flow techniques. Our dynamic checks let us rule out unsafe paths during the execution of the program while preserving secure flows of information. In this way, we can certify the safety of programs even in face of features which are difficult to analyze statically, such as subtyping polymorphism. To validate our ideas, we have materialized them into a tool, InspectorJ, which inserts instrumentation in a program to prevent the execution of unsafe paths.

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