Esquema de Estruturação SbC-EC para Log Seguro

• Sérgio Câmara UFRJ / INMETRO
• Luci Pirmez UFRJ
• Luiz F. R. C. Carmo UFRJ / INMETRO

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2014.20120

Abstract

Secure log schemes ensure detection of possible attacks against audit logs located in devices under an unprotected environment. This paper describes the structure scheme SbC-EC for secure logging, suitable for storage and network communication constrained devices, presenting two new features: Split by Category and Entry Compaction. We also describe the SbC-EC MAC secure log scheme, which implements the new proposed structure along with symmetric cryptography primitives and the FssAgg authentication scheme for protecting the log files. SbC-EC MAC presents a storage gain in comparison to other existing symmetric secure log schemes.

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