Recuperação do Serviço de Pelotão de Veículos Autônomos e Conectados Baseado em Modelos Virtuais Contra Ataques na Rede e Sensores
Resumo
A formação em pelotão de veículos autônomos e conectados (VACs) é a estrutura topológica mais comum de VACs, onde veículos trafegam relativamente próximos, respondendo aos comandos do líder e provendo serviços de transporte autônomo e inteligente. Contudo, com a evolução dos pelotões de VACs vários tipos de ataques de injeção de dados falsos em redes e sensores têm comprometido a estabilidade do pelotão, resultando na fragmentação ou, no pior caso, em serias colisões. Este trabalho propõe um mecanismo, denominada PReCAV, para a recuperação cooperativa de pelotão de VACs diante de ataques de injeção de dados falsos, apoiada por modelos virtuais e físicos do sistema, a fim de manter resiliência em meio à ataques em rede e sensores. Uma avaliação por simulação mostrou que o PReCAV manteve a estabilidade do pelotão ao prover resiliência, privando-o de variações de 4,42m/s2 de aceleração, 13m/s de velocidade e 40m de distância entre veículos em ataques na rede e variações de 4,43m/s2, 10,7m/s e 33,4m em ataques nos sensores.
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