Over-The-Air (OTA) Updates for Vehicular Embedded Devices with End-to-End Reliable Computing

• Guilherme A. Thomaz UFRJ
• Matteo Sammarco Independent Researcher
• Miguel Elias M. Campista UFRJ

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbrc.2024.1442

Abstract

Connected vehicles have software that needs to be updated to correct vulnerabilities and add new features. Over-the-air (OTA) updates prevent the owner from bringing the vehicle to a service center but enable attacks that modify the executables, putting lives at risk. This paper proposes an OTA architecture that combines the two most widely adopted hardware security technologies: Intel SGX on the server and ARM TrustZone on the client. This work stands out by proposing end-to-end trusted computing to protect the architecture from attackers capable of controlling the entire operating system, both in the server and vehicle. The implementation uses the CACIC-DevKit on the server and a vehicular-embedded device with the OP-TEE secure system. The experiments reveal that the impact of TEE is only 2% of the total time for transferring a 1KB software block.

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