Prevenção de Ataques em Sistemas Distribuídos via Análise de Intervalos

• Vitor Mendes Paisante UFMG
• Luiz Felipe Zafra Saggioro UFMG
• Raphael Ernani Rodrigues UFMG
• Leonardo Barbosa Oliveira UFMG
• Fernando Magno Quintão Pereira UFMG

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5753/sbseg.2014.20132

Abstract

The range analysis of integer variables determines the lowest and highest bounds that each variable assumes throughout the execution of a program. This technique is vital to detect a plethora of software vulnerabilities but the literature does not describe any principled way to apply range analysis on distributed systems. This negligence is unfortunate, as networks are the most common targets of software attacks. The goal of this paper is to set right this omission. Capitalizing on a recent algorithm to infer communication protocols, we have designed, implemented and tested a range analysis for distributed systems. Our contribution, a holistic view of the system, is more precise than analyzing each system module independently. In this paper we support this statement through a number of examples, and experiments performed on top of the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks. A prototype of our tool, implemented on the LLVM compiler, is available for scrutiny.

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